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Abstract
Many successful terrorist groups operate across international borders where different
countries host different stages of terrorist operations. Often the recruits for the group
come from one country or countries, while the targets of the operations are in an-
other. Stopping such attacks is difficult because intervention in any region or route
might merely shift the terrorists elsewhere. Here we propose a model of transnational
terrorism based on the theory of activity networks. The model represents attacks on
different countries as paths in a network. The group is assumed to prefer paths of
lowest cost (or risk) and maximal yield from attacks. The parameters of the model
are computed for the Islamist-Salafi terrorist movement based on open source data
and then used for estimation of risks of future attacks. The central finding is that
the USA has an enduring appeal as a target, due to lack of other nations of matching
geopolitical weight or openness. It is also shown that countries in Africa and Asia that
have been overlooked as terrorist bases may become highly significant threats in the
future. The model quantifies the dilemmas facing countries in the effort to cut such
networks, and points to a limitation of deterrence against transnational terrorists.
Keywords: terrorism, transnational terrorist networks, activity networks, network in-
terdiction, rational choice theory, LA-UR 10-05689
Address: Center for Nonlinear Studies and T-5, Theoretical Division, Los Alamos Na-
tional Laboratory, Los Alamos, NewMexico 87545 USA. agutfraind.research@gmail.com
1 Introduction
Despite vast investments in counter-terrorism, victory in the global war on ter-
ror remains elusive. In part this is because terrorist groups are highly adaptive
in their tactics and strategy. When airport scanners were installed to detect
weapons and explosives, terrorists switched to explosives that cannot be de-
tected using the scanners and to other modes of attack [21, 8]. When it became
harder to reach US soil or attack US embassies groups shifted to attacks against
other countries or less fortified installations [7, 37]. Like international businesses,
globalized terrorist groups are vast international enterprises that tap into the
most successful business practices and cost-efficient solutions [2]. If a country
erects high barriers to entry or develops an effective domestic counter-terrorism
response then terrorists switch their targeting to a safer and more accessible
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1 Introduction 2
place. If a country no longer provides a haven for recruitment, training and
planning of operations, those will shift elsewhere[18].
Adaptability makes risk estimation challenging. One possible basis for risk
assessment is extrapolation of historical data, such as the ITERATE dataset of
transnational attacks [27]. Fig. 1 shows all ITERATE attacks carried out by
Islamist groups on OECD countries in which the national origins of the attackers
and the target country are known. Many of the incidents in the matrix are due
ethno-nationalist conflicts, such the GIA attacks in France or due to attacks
by home-grown cells inspired by Salafis. While a substantial fraction of attacks
were against the US, many attacks also targeted France, the UK and other
countries.
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countries of origin
US
UK
Sweden
Spain
South Korea
Slovakia
Portugal
Poland
Norway
New Zealand
Netherlands
Luxembourg
Japan
Italy
Ireland
Hungary
Greece
Germany
France
Finland
Denmark
Czech Rep.
Canada
Belgium
Austria
Australia
Fig. 1: Terrorist attacks by Islamist groups over 1990-2008. The fraction of all
transnational plots that originated at country i and targeted country j
is proportional to the area of a circle at coordinates (i, j). The source
countries on the horizontal axis account for > 99% of all attacks against
OECD countries (vertical).
In the rest of the paper we will introduce another method for risk assess-
ment: a quantitative network-based model. The model takes demographic and
economic information pertaining to violent Islamist-Salafi groups - the most
probable source of future attacks - and estimates the risk of various transna-
tional terror plots. The model suggests that the future of transnational terrorism
may be substantially different from the past:
1. several regions will become large new sources of transnational terrorism
(sec. 4),
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2. the US will rise as the terrorists’ preferred attack destination (sec. 4),
3. successes in stopping foreign-based plots against the US will increase the
threat to other countries (subsec. 4.1), and
4. deterrence will be hard to achieve (subsec. 4.2).
The model is based on an activity network for stages of terrorist attacks. The
network represents decisions required for terrorist operations on the global scale,
such as which country to attack. No distinction is made between “transnational”
and “international” terrorism, both referring to terrorist groups that operate
using foreign bases, support or inspiration. This coarsened scale of analysis
exposes the strategic picture and can guide counter-terrorism decision making
at the national and international levels. It also quantifies a kind of unintended
effect from counter-terrorism measures known as “transboundary externality”
[30, 31]: the redirection of terrorists from one country to another, because the
latter is less protected.
To the author’s knowledge, this is the first model of its kind in the open
literature. Previous work considered target selection by terrorists but where
targets are implicitly within a single country so the costs of bringing the attack-
ers and their weapons to their target are negligible (see e.g. [3]). In contrast,
for transnational terrorism security measures and international logistics play a
central role in attack planning [16, Ch.3]. Other work considered the structure
of the terrorist networks at the level of individual operatives or functions, rather
than as a global network (cf. [10, 23, 5, 13, 38].)
It is sometimes argued that such economic models of terrorism are unreliable
because terrorism is an irrational behavior by fanatics. However, the prepon-
derance of evidence supports the alternative view - the rational choice theory
(RCT) [34]. RCT claims that terrorist groups and leaders are rational agents
capable of strategic decision-making. Their decisions are expressions of “instru-
mental rationality”, that is, consistent with their values and objectives [20]. The
sophistication and technological adaptability of terrorists, such as in developing
triggers for explosives, is strong evidence for their intelligence [18, 15]. More
evidence for RCT comes from studies of target selection [31]. Those consistently
find evidence for a substitution effect - as governments improve protection to
certain targets, terrorists substitute them with less protected targets [1, 6, 15].
Indeed, the defining feature of terrorism - the use of violence against civilians
rather than against military targets - is a strategic substitution effect because
the latter are harder targets. Another line of evidence for rationality comes from
analyzing the internal dynamics of terrorist groups. Rather like non-violent or-
ganizations, they perform cost-benefit analyses, employ financial controls and
run financial audits [33, 32].
2 A Model of Transnational Terrorism
We now describe a model of a transnational terrorist groups. Such groups are
characterized by their global aims, as opposed to regional conflicts; they recruit
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and attack throughout the world. Islamic fundamentalist groups will serve as
the central application of this model. These include al-Qaida, Hezbollah but
also possibly extremist groups not currently thought to be violent, such as Hizb-
ut-Tahrir. Rather than considering specific groups and limiting to their current
bases of operation, this study will consider every region of the world that cur-
rently or may in the future host violent Islamic groups. We focus on those groups
because they are probably the most potent present-day transnational terrorist
threat. The model could also evaluate other violent transnational ideologies if
we re-estimate its parameters.
2.1 Operations Submodel
Suppose a transnational group controls a cell in a country, and must decide
where to dispatch this cell (the cell might also be self-mobilizing, in which
case it must solve its own targeting problem.) The three options are (1) do a
domestic attack, (2) send the cell to attack another country, and (3) do nothing.
Option (1) entails certain risks and costs for collecting intelligence and preparing
weapons. Dispatching the cell into another country, (2), incurs the additional
cost and risk of interception due to security barriers, such a visas, intelligence
collection in a foreign environment, and cultural difficulties. However, the other
country might have more favorable security environment or offer better targets -
more significant or less protected. Option (3) - abandon the attack and hide - has
little or no risk or accounting cost and preserves the cell for future operations.
Any rational decision maker must weight the costs and benefits and take
the action offering the greatest net benefit. Surely then terrorists would also
do such analysis, weighing at least the most obvious target choices and travel
routes. A simple way of representing this is with an activity network, where
nodes represent different stages of terrorist operations at different countries,
and edges show the cost and risk involved in each stage (Fig. 2). In Fig. 2, the
columns correspond to the countries, including the country of origin, while the
rows correspond to the postures of the cells: the stages of the plots.
The network represents the options of the rational decision maker as directed
paths - chains of nodes and directed edges that start in the source country node
and lead to either the “attack” node or the “abandon/hide” node. If complete
information is available about the costs and benefits of each option, then the
rational decision is to select the path with the highest utility, that is the path
with highest net benefit (benefit minus cost.) For any path p, the cost c(p) is
found by adding the weights on the edges (tasks) constituting the path.
The edge weights of this network could represent resources like money or
materiel that are consumed and produced by terrorist operations. The network
could also be used to perform a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA): to evaluate
the gains from possible operations and the probabilities of successfully complet-
ing intermediate stages in the operations. Such a PRA is what we will do. In
other words we will take the perspective of the terrorists: determine what they
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Execute Operation
Abort/Hide
USASympathizers UK Egypt
Indo-
nesia
Afgha-
nistan
Mobilization
Translocation
cost
Interception
cost
Yield from
attack
Fig. 2: Illustration of the model for 5 countries. The vertical direction represents
countries while the horizontal represents different stages in execution
of plots. Domestic attack plans correspond to motion upwards, while
transnational attacks also make a diagonal transition. The full model
includes many more countries.
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want and what they fear in order to anticipate how they will act1.
It is an open question whether terrorist groups can or will use such an alge-
braic method to analyze their operations. However, given their sophistication
they may well come to the same decisions using other means or through op-
erational experience. Of course they might also intentionally avoid the most
probable attacks to achieve surprise, but only at a cost (and models could also
be constructed to anticipate that too.)
Consider now the following specific model for transnational terrorist attacks,
Fig. 2. A cell that was mobilized at country i experiences (1) the translocation
cost/risk, Tij , representing the barriers for moving from country i to country j;
(2) the risk of interception at country j, Ij ; and (3) the yield Yj from attacks
at country j. Yield reflects the gain to the terrorists from a successful attack,
and so has the opposite sign from cost. A domestic attack at country i has cost
c(p) = Tii + Ii + Yi while a transnational attack has cost c(p) = Tij + Ij + Yj
(i 6= j). Because negative edge weights are costs in the sum that represent risks,
the words “cost” and “risk” will be used interchangeably. Sometimes attackers
reach country j through one or several intermediate countries (exploiting e.g.
the Schengen treaty), a possibility we ignore for simplicity. From the counter-
terrorism point of view, the likelihood of a particular plot depends also on
the supply of plots originating at each country. Therefore, we will estimate
for each country i the number of cells that originate there, Si. If the group
decides to abandon, its path has cost c(p) = A. The value of A may be a
negative, representing the preservation of the cell, or positive, if the cell cannot
be reactivated.
It is possible to include additional costs like cost of recruitment or training
in the model but this will be left for future studies because the data is hard to
estimate. Here it was assumed that the costs are negligible and indeed many
cells involved in recent attacks recruited themselves and trained with informa-
tion obtained from websites. Another possible extension is attacking country j
through its foreign representatives: embassies, officials and even tourists. Such
attacks represent a different type of attack path and could be easily added, al-
beit by adding more hard-to-estimate parameters to the model. Similarly, one
may consider attack on modes of international transit such as airplanes and
ships.
The model’s parameters can be estimated from open source information with
a modest degree of confidence (see section 3). Briefly, transit costs were esti-
mated from data on global migration, the risk of interception from national
1 Here is how PRA is represented by networks. Suppose in a multi-stage terrorist operation
rs is the probability of success at stage s (out of k stages in total) conditional on success
at every previous stage. Suppose the gain from a successful operation is G (≥ 1). Then
the expected gain from the operation is E = r1r2 . . . rkG. Let us now relate rs values to
costs (cs ≥ 0) using exponentiation: rs = e−cs , and let the gain be a function of yield Y :
G = e−Y . Thus, an attack has expected gain E = exp [− (c1 + c2 + . . .+ ck + Y )]. In the
network representation of terrorist operations, we can compute the sums in the exponent by
adding edge weights along network paths that trace through all the stages. Paths of lower
weights translate to attacks of greater expected gain. By comparing such paths we could
anticipate which attacks would have the highest expected gain.
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expenditure on internal security and attack yields based on the political power
of the targeted country, represented by its GDP. The supply of plots is esti-
mated from public opinion surveys measuring support for terrorist attacks and
demographic data.
2.2 Stochastic Decisions Submodel
If transnational terrorist groups could determine the values of the parameters
precisely (the next section discusses this problem), then they should be able to
plot the optimal attack from each country i by considering all possible options
and finding the path that minimizes cost:
min
j
Tij +Bj + Yj︸ ︷︷ ︸
c(pij)
 .
However, one of the general difficulties in decision making is uncertainties
about costs and risks. Terrorists, like other decision makers should therefore
occasionally identify the optimal attack incorrectly. Reliable risk assessment
must therefore take into account the possibility that adversaries make mistakes
(as well as use unpredictability to achieve surprise - but that is even harder
to assess.) Fortunately, suitable stochastic prediction methods have already
been developed for activity network models like in Fig. 2. With those methods
probabilities can be assigned to different terrorist plans based on the costs of
the corresponding paths on the network. We use the model in [14, Ch.3] based
on Markov chains. In it the path of least cost is typically assigned the highest
probability but other paths have non-zero probabilities, and these probabilities
can be quite high (for details see Appendix, sec. B).2
From this Markov chain model it is possible to compute the number of times
any particular country (represented by its attack node) would be targeted as well
as to compute the changes in targeting due to various defensive actions, which
are represented as increases in edge weights. It is also possible to determine
whether defensive actions would materially increase the costs for the adversaries
or merely lead them to change targets.
2 One of the advantages of the stochastic model is that it can interpolate between the two
extremes of complete ignorance and perfect information using a single parameter λ (≥ 0)
that describes the amount of information available to the adversaries. For a given level of
information, the probability that a path p would be selected is proportional to exp(−λ c(p)).
When λ is very large the path of least cost has a much higher probability than any of the
alternatives, while λ close to 0 assigns all paths approximately the same probability. We set
λ = 0.1 in the following but its value has a smooth effect on the predicted plots (i.e. the
sensitivity is low). A value of 0.1 means that if the terrorist group learns of a increase in path
cost by 10 units, its probability of taking the path will decrease by a multiplicative factor of
≈ 2.72. The effect depends on the original path probability: it is not as great a decrease when
the original probability is high.
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3 Estimation of Parameters
The model contains several sets of inputs: (1) the supply of plots at country i, Si;
(2) barriers for moving from country i to country j Tij ; (3) risk of interception
at country j, Ij ; and (4) the yield from attacks at country j, Yj . The yield
of abandoning, A will be set to ∞ (no abandoned plots) and its effect will
be analyzed separately. Because (1)-(4) contain security-related information
that is also difficult to measure, the information is not published. Luckily, one
can derive estimates from publicly-available demographic and economic data.
Readers wishing to see the final results of estimates should skip to tables 1, 3
and 2 of the Appendix and ignore the rest of this section.
In building the estimates, it will be assumed for simplicity that each stage
of terrorist operations carries about the same amount of risk. Namely, that the
medians of Tij (i 6= j) and of Ij both equal1. Of course, some plots will be much
less risky than others because both Tij and Ij have considerable variability. The
yield from attacks is also normalized relative to the median. Transformations
of this kind on costs and yields are unavoidable if we wish to remove the effect
of units, but they do reduce the reliability of the model. However, the core
findings of the model regarding certain countries agree well with intuition, as
will be seen.
3.1 Estimating the Supply of Plots, Si
To assess the threat from the greater violent Islamic movement it is not suf-
ficient to consider the support for a particular group like al-Qaida. Even if
we assumed that al-Qaida has no support in certain countries, other groups
might mobilize supporters there. Another concern is self-mobilization: modern
terrorist groups sometimes avoid active recruitment and instead provide inspi-
ration and guidance while relying on self-radicalization to provide them with
foot soldiers [29].
A comprehensive picture on possible plots can be obtained from surveys.
Over the last decade most recently in 2009 the Pew charitable trusts run several
global attitude surveys which among others, asked Muslims about their support
for suicide bombings [36]. In each of the surveyed countries respondents were
asked to state whether suicide bombings is “never justified” (σn), “rarely justi-
fied” (σr), “sometimes justified” (σs), and “often justified” (σo). These are given
as fractions of the respondents. For some countries no data was available, so the
quantities were extrapolated from countries in the same geographic region (e.g.
Middle East, Americas etc.) Pew also collected data on the Muslim population
in 235 different countries and territories (Ji) [24] (of course the overwhelming
majority of Muslim everywhere are opposed to terrorism in the name of their
religion). The supply of violent plots can be estimated by taking the population
and multiplying by the weighted fraction of respondents professing support for
violence (the weights are sr, ss, so). One must also take into account that only a
small fraction of those who profess radical ideology would actually be involved
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in a plot and that several people are involved in each plot (a factor Q):
Si := Q · Ji · (srσr + ssσs + soσo) .
The support weights were set by default based on the assumption that every
increase in professed support leads to an increase by a factor of 2 in the re-
sources available to terrorist groups: (sr, ss, so)=(0.25, 0.50, 1.00). Appendix A
explores the sensitivity of supply Si to this assumption through two alternatives:
most of the tangible support come from the narrow but committed minority,
(sr, ss, so)=(0.1, 0.2, 1.0), and a situation where even the least-committed sup-
porters materially boost the terrorists, (sr, ss, so)=(0.33, 0.66, 1.00). Notes that
the weights effect only the relative importance of regions as sources of terrorism,
not the targets of plots originating in a given region.
The factor Q is dependent on social and tactical issues, and hence should
not vary much across countries. Because Q enters as a multiplicative term
at all source countries, its value has no bearing on the relative risk estimates.
Nevertheless, it could be crudely estimated as follows. In 2006 the head of the
British Security Service (MI5) reported that: “... my officers and the police
are working to contend with some 200 groupings or networks, totaling over
1600 identified individuals (and there will be many we don’t know) who are
actively engaged in plotting, or facilitating, terrorist acts here and overseas”
[25]. Furthermore “over 100,000 of our citizens consider that the July 2005
attacks in London were justified.” This implies active participation at a rate of
at least 1.6% and 8 people per plot (Q = 0.002).
3.2 Estimating the Barriers for Moving from Country i to
Country j, Tij
Barriers to transnational attacks include both deliberate barriers such as screen-
ing and intelligence, and unofficial barriers such as differences in language and
culture. Official barriers depend on factors such as the intelligence available on
targets in the destination country, the cooperation the targeted country received
from both the country of departure and the transport agent (e.g. airline). None
of those figures are publicly available but a proxy measure can be found, as
follows. Transnational terrorists often use tourism, education or immigration as
cover to obtain travel documents and permits. Indeed, travel in all of those cate-
gories became more difficult across the developed world as a result of the security
measures introduced after the 9/11 attacks. Migration patterns thus provide an
estimate of official barriers. Unofficial barriers to migration are likewise similar
to the unofficial barriers to terrorism, including differences in language, culture,
ethnicity and others. Therefore, the foreign-born migrant population, suitably
normalized, could be used as a proxy of transnational freedom of travel. Migra-
tion into most OECD countries is documented by the OECD [28].
It is to be expected that the number of migrants would be positively correlated
with the population of the countries and negatively correlated with distance.
This is known as a “gravity law” model. Many national and international re-
lationships such as trade flows are well-approximated by gravity laws [9, 19],
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named for their similarity to Newton’s law for the force of gravity. Therefore
an estimate for the number of migrants between country i and country j is
the product of their populations (data: UN) divided by their distance squared
(data: CEPII [26]): pipj
d2
ij
. When the actual number of migrants, mij , falls below
this estimate, that may indicate heightened official or unofficial barriers. Thus
we define the raw transnational terrorism barrier between countries i and j as:
T̂ij :=
pipj
d2ij
/mij .
The data must now be standardized, for several reasons: (1) the barrier data
should be comparable with other costs considered by the terrorists (and in the
model) by removing the effects of units for population and distance; and (2)
since the barrier is a cost and risk, it must be represented by positive number
in the activity network. Therefore, the quantity Tij was computed from T̂ij by
determining the minimum (MinT̂ ) and median (MedT̂ ). Because of (2) MinT
is subtracted from T̂ij , and for (1) the quantity is divided by the median of the
shifted values:
Tij =
(
T̂ij −MinT̂
)
/
(
MedT̂ −MinT̂
)
.
The resulting values have a median of 1.0. The more standard procedure of first
removing the average and dividing by the standard deviation was rejected be-
cause the distribution is visibly non-Gaussian with large positive outliers (hence
a skewed mean and large variance). Domestic operations will be assumed to have
negligible barriers (Tii = 0 for all countries i). The OECD data lacks informa-
tion about migration to non-OECD countries. Therefore set Tij =∞ in all such
cases (effectively blocking such paths).
While the OECD includes some of the most geopolitically-important nations
of the planet, obtaining data on translocation costs to non-OECD countries
would be valuable for two reasons. First, only with such data can we estimate
the risk of terrorism to those nations (such as the July 11 bombings in Kampala),
and second to estimate the effect of counter-terrorism policies in the OECD on
terrorism in other countries. Indeed, in the ITERATE database of terrorist
incidents [27], attacks on OECD countries that can be traced to Islamist groups
account for only 22% of all Islamist attacks.
3.3 Estimating the Risk of Interception at Country j, Ij
The risk of interception can be estimated from OECD data on expenditure on
public order and safety as percentage of GDP. The relevant figure is the fraction
of GDP rather than the raw figure because the number of valuable targets is
related to the size of the economy, so the fractional figure indicates the
level of security vulnerable sites can receive. The GDP also correlates with
the population size (in rich countries) and thus to the amount of police resources
available per person. The extreme case of totalitarian police states is suggestive:
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in such countries internal security expenditures are disproportionately large rel-
ative to the GDP, and indeed terrorists have a lot of difficulties operating there
[17]. This estimate of course neglects the efficiency of internal security force - a
factor that is hard to estimate.
The internal security data is transformed almost exactly like the barrier data
and for the same reasons: start with figures for internal security expenditure as a
fraction of GDP for country j, SECj then compute the minimum (MinSEC =
minj SECj) and median (MedSEC), and then normalize:
Ij = (SECj −MinSEC) / (MedSEC −MinSEC) .
Generally speaking, we find that there is not much variation in the risk of
interception in different countries (raw data is in the Appendix, sec. A), as
compared to variation in factors such as yield, discussed next. This suggests
that interception risk plays a minor role in target choice.
3.4 Estimating the Yield from Attacks at Country j, Yj
Transnational terrorist attacks attempt to influence policies. For example, one
of al-Qaida’s original objectives was to compel the withdrawal of US forces from
Arabia, while Hezbollah forced France and the US to withdraw their peacekeep-
ers from Lebanon in the 1980s. The precise value of targets shifts with time
and the political situation, but typically larger richer countries make for more
powerful players in the international arena, and hence more important targets.
Moreover, their homelands carry more targets of symbolic, political and eco-
nomic significance. The economic damage from the loss of life and physical
assets is also higher in richer countries because they tend to have higher pro-
ductivity for labor and capital. Thus, it is expected that transnational terrorists
would seek to attack larger richer countries. The weight of a country can be
estimated from its dollar GDP figures at current exchange rates (source: UN
data).
Timing or political dynamics does play a role in transnational terrorism but
its importance might be overestimated. For example, the Madrid 2004/03/11
train bombings are often viewed as intending to pressure the Spanish government
to withdraw its forces from Iraq, and they were timed with the Spanish elections.
But surely an important factor was Spain’s geopolitical weight (GDP is ranked
12th in the world) and its large contribution to the 2003 invasion. Otherwise
al-Qaida could have just as well pressured smaller countries such as El Salvador
and Mongolia to withdraw their contributions to the invasion.
Here is how the yield Yj was computed from the GDP figures. Recall that
costs (barriers, internal security) are all positive, so yields must be negative. Let
the minimum GDP be MinGDP , and the median MedGDP . The following
formula produces negative values with a standardized median:
Yj = (MinGDP −GDPj) / (MedGDP −MinGDP ) .
The resulting values have a median of −1.0.
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4 Predictions
One way of representing the solution of the model is through an attack matrix,
the counterpart of the historical data matrix in Fig. 1.) The model predicts
(Fig. 3) that the United States would attract the bulk of transnational terrorism
- all other countries are almost free of terrorism (white squares). The reason
the United States is such a magnet is because of its vast geopolitical weight and
relatively open borders.
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Fig. 3: Predicted attack risk matrix. The area of a circle at coordinates (i, j)
is proportional to the number of plots from i to j. The bottom row
indicates that the vast majority of plots target the US.
Examination of the sources for attacks exposes a number of risks. There is
a considerable terrorist threat from Bangladesh, India, Indonesia and Nigeria.
They combine a large population and relatively high support for terrorism. It is
notable that the 2009 Christmas bomber was Nigerian - one of the first attacks
on OECD from that country.
The high burden of attacks borne by the US is directly related to the rational
choice model: if there is a big prize to be won by attacking the US, no rational
terrorist would attack other countries. The reasons why non-US attacks do occur
(cf. Fig. 1) include: (1) some terrorist groups such as ethno-nationalist groups
see as their enemy a particular country and lack a global strategy; (2) global
Salafi groups have not yet expanded their recruitment channels in countries
such as Nigeria and Bangladesh, so a large fraction of attacks is still carried
out by groups with more narrow agendas; and (3) the US has deployed counter-
terrorism measures commensurate with the threat it faces, making the US too
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costly to attack.
One implication of this finding concerns US policy. The matrix justifies
in principle outlays by the US government towards countering international
terrorism as a whole, without regard to its target. Investments in international
counter-terrorism measures, such as policing, if effective in reducing the number
of plots, are also efficient from the US perspective because the US, being the
target of choice, will retain most of the benefits from reducing the terror threat
[22]. Unfortunately, many policies previously adopted were ineffective or had
perverse effects on international terrorism (the so-called “blowback”) (see e.g.
[11, 12].)
4.1 National Fortresses
Consider now several alternative scenarios for the future, motivated by strength-
ening of counter-terrorism defenses, which may make transnational attacks less
feasible. Suppose the US was successful in deterring attacks against itself by
greatly increasing the barriers to entering US soil. If so, Fig. 4 shows the likely
effect.
The protection of US frontiers will significantly increase the attack risk to
most other OECD nations because transnational groups should then switch to
more accessible targets. Perhaps surprisingly, Japan, now rarely mentioned as a
target will see the largest absolute increase in terrorism. This prediction is due
to its international profile, Japan being the second largest country in the OECD
on several measures. Japan’s woes will be shared to some extent by most other
major OECD countries, who will also see an increase in attacks.
Another possible scenario is where the security forces in each country are
able to intercept the majority of external plots against their homelands. In
other words, the translocation cost becomes very large (Tij =∞ for i 6= j). In
this world, the dominant form of terrorism is home-grown. As Fig. 5 shows,
this materially changes the risk matrix. Countries such as the France, with
relatively large and relatively radicalized Muslim communities will see much
more terrorism.
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Fig. 4: Attack risk matrix in scenario where US becomes inaccessible to foreign
plots. Terrorist plots increase in all other OECD countries.
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Fig. 5: Attack matrix in a scenario where OECD countries cannot be accessed by
foreigners (both inside and outside the OECD). Countries with relatively
large radicalized Muslim populations (e.g. France) rise in rank relative
to their OECD peers. The total number of attacks on OECD countries
must decrease significantly because foreign plots are blocked.
The two scenarios point to large conflicts of interest between OECD countries
in tackling transnational terrorism. Helping the US intercept plots through
advance warning will increase terrorism everywhere else. More broadly, country
A will not always benefit from helping country B. Doing so might sometimes
increase the chances that A’s enemies, some of which even based in B, will
shift to B. This factor may explain part of the difficulty achieving intelligence
sharing and international police cooperation. Indeed B could even come to
an understanding with its home-grown terrorists in which they abstain from
domestic attacks in return for non-intervention in their activities.
4.2 Deterrence
A number of defensive strategies are founded on deterrence. In terrorism, deter-
rence may involve convincing would-be groups or cells that operations are too
risky or that the entire struggle they wage is hopeless. The model can express
such conditions on a global level by varying the parameter A, the perceived
yield from abandoning. Raising this yield is equivalent to raising risks through-
out the network. The effect of A is non-linear, showing a threshold at around
A = −35 beyond which attacks decline (Fig. 6.) Unfortunately, the threshold
lies quite high, indeed nearer to the yield from attacking the US (−54) than
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countries such as France (−6.8), implying that it would be necessary to create
a very large deterrence effect to reduce the number of plots.
If this level of deterrence is somehow achieved, the reduction in attacks will
not occur at once in all countries because cells in some countries have lower
translocation costs than cells in other countries. As a result, their perceived
net benefit and probability of success are higher. Thus plots originating within
the developed countries such as the G7 and especially home-grown plots will be
the last to experience deterrence because they originate so close to high-value
targets.
140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 20 40
Yield of abandonment (A)
0
100000
200000
300000
400000
500000
attacks
abandoned
plots
Fig. 6: The number of attacks as a function of the yield from abandoning. Neg-
ative values make abandoning more competitive and decrease attacks
(left side) while positive values indicate that abandoning is costly and
encourage attacks (right side). The vertical black line indicates the yield
from attacking the US - the most valuable target. The sigmoid shapes
suggest that the effect of deterrence is low until a threshold is reached,
but the threshold must be close to the perceived value of attacking the
US.
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5 Discussion
The network model draws attention to differences between our past experi-
ence with terrorism and its possible future. Populous regions like Nigeria and
Bangladesh are predicted to produce many plots although they have not par-
ticipated significantly in transnational terrorism yet. If those regions start pro-
ducing terrorists at a level commensurate with their size and radicalization,
the world will see many more attacks. Alternatively, it is possible that those
regions have characteristics that hold back violent extremism. If so, future re-
search should identify those characteristics and suggest policies that maintain
and encourage them.
The model confirms the significant danger from substitution effects. Per-
ceived successes in reducing the number of attacks against it may be due to a
strategic redirection by terrorist groups that increases the risk to other coun-
tries. In the scenario where the US deters all attacks by foreign terrorists, many
other countries would experience a large increase in threats. To an extent this
has already been seen in Europe.
The model introduced above has limitations, some introduced for simplicity,
some that are inherent from its foundation as a network model. Perhaps the
most significant shortcoming is the assumption that a terrorist group’s main
resource are its human resources. In practice, attacks also require intelligence
gathering, training and materials. Those resources need to be brought together
while maintaining motivation and secrecy. Nevertheless, the model captures
some of the probabilistic analysis used by transnational groups within the well-
developed framework of network theory.
6 Conclusions
The paper introduces a model of transnational terrorist groups that represents
operations as a global activity network. It is possible to estimate the parameters
of the model, and then predict the number of plots directed at OECD target
countries from countries throughout the world. The model highlights the excep-
tionally high risk of attacks against the US. If the US is successful in deterring
attacks against itself without reducing the overall supply of terror then most
OECD countries would see sharp increases in attacks because of a substitution
effect.
The scale of the substitution effect calls for studies into counter-terrorism
policies that are designed to anticipate and sterilize it. Fortunately, the problem,
termed “network interdiction” has already been studied in the context of other
networks [35, 4]. Those mathematical methods can identify where barriers can
be erected in the transnational terrorist network to produce an increase in the
costs to the terrorists in such a way that they cannot avoid it by shifting their
plots to other countries. Therefore it should be possible to develop efficient and
game-theoretically robust multi-national defense strategies.
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A Parameter Estimates
Tab. 1: Information about countries: the interception cost (left) and the yields
from attacks (right). The interception cost (Ij) is not known for all
OECD states. For this reason, only the countries where it was available
(the left table) were considered as possible targets.
Country Intercept. Cost Ij
New Zealand 2.3
United Kingdom 2.1
Czech Republic 1.6
Hungary 1.6
United States 1.5
Slovakia 1.5
Estonia 1.5
Portugal 1.4
Italy 1.3
Spain 1.3
Poland 1.2
Netherlands 1.2
Israel 1.1
Belgium 1.1
Slovenia 1.0
Germany 1.0
Canada 0.9
Austria 0.9
Iceland 0.8
Ireland 0.8
Japan 0.8
Sweden 0.7
Finland 0.6
France 0.6
South Korea 0.6
Greece 0.5
Denmark 0.3
Luxembourg 0.2
Norway 0.2
Australia 0.0
Country Yield Yj
United States -54.0
Japan -24.1
Germany -9.5
United Kingdom -7.8
France -6.8
Italy -5.3
Canada -3.8
Spain -3.2
South Korea -3.1
Australia -2.2
Netherlands -1.8
Sweden -1.2
Belgium -1.1
Austria -0.9
Poland -0.9
Norway -0.8
Denmark -0.7
Greece -0.6
Finland -0.6
Ireland -0.5
Portugal -0.4
Czech Republic -0.2
New Zealand -0.2
Hungary -0.2
Slovakia -0.0
Luxembourg -0.0
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Tab. 2: Translocation costs Tij (country i to country j) for select country pairs.
Rows are countries of departure, columns are the destinations. Notice
that Japan has relatively large barriers, as estimated by its abnormally
low population of immigrants.
Destination –> Australia Canada France Germany Italy Japan South Korea Spain UK US
Afghanistan 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.1 29.5 44.2 44.2 18.1 0.3 0.1
Algeria 0.2 0.1 0.1 9.9 15.1 32.4 32.4 9.2 6.2 1.9
Azerbaijan 0.6 0.3 10.3 4.3 50.2 71.6 71.6 9.3 5.1 0.2
Bangladesh 0.4 0.1 8.1 3.2 1.2 12.9 8.9 5.4 0.1 0.3
Burkina Faso 6.3 2.0 1.1 5.4 2.5 192.0 192.0 27.8 44.1 11.2
Chad 2.8 0.6 0.7 12.2 43.9 407.2 407.2 62.4 15.3 9.3
Cote d’Ivoire 2.1 0.5 0.1 2.8 0.8 17.7 17.7 8.1 1.5 1.2
Egypt 0.0 0.1 1.9 1.1 2.7 12.8 12.8 13.9 1.4 0.2
France 0.0 0.1 0.0 34.6 1.9 1.8 2.7 1.3 28.2 0.2
Guinea 2.2 0.4 0.3 0.4 3.4 4.8 4.8 0.6 8.3 1.2
India 0.2 0.1 4.9 3.5 5.9 64.4 153.1 9.4 0.3 0.2
Indonesia 0.3 0.2 2.5 0.9 7.6 5.0 3.2 7.0 1.3 0.3
Iran 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.5 4.4 3.1 3.1 4.0 0.5 0.1
Iraq 0.0 0.0 3.0 0.5 13.6 98.3 98.3 5.3 0.3 0.1
Jordan 0.0 0.0 3.5 1.4 2.9 9.2 9.2 1.2 0.8 0.0
Kazakhstan 0.5 0.1 7.4 23.1 5.9 81.6 81.6 8.8 2.9 0.4
Libya 0.0 0.1 6.3 4.3 0.8 55.4 55.4 15.1 0.7 0.4
Malaysia 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.1 4.1 1.8 14.8 3.7 0.0 0.1
Morocco 0.2 0.1 0.1 1.0 0.3 13.1 13.1 0.7 3.3 0.6
Mozambique 0.7 0.4 1.8 0.8 3.8 472.8 472.8 2.0 0.4 1.7
Nigeria 0.7 0.5 14.3 1.8 3.1 8.3 8.3 4.4 0.4 0.4
Pakistan 0.2 0.1 2.3 1.6 2.2 11.6 9.7 1.4 0.1 0.2
Palestine 0.0 0.0 2.7 1.5 15.5 1e+200 1e+200 3.9 0.7 0.0
Russia 0.1 0.1 6.8 38.3 6.8 10.3 10.3 3.1 7.5 0.2
Saudi Arabia 0.2 0.1 4.4 3.7 20.7 32.4 32.4 15.6 0.6 0.2
Senegal 0.4 0.4 0.0 1.3 0.1 6.3 6.3 0.4 4.7 0.8
Somalia 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.2 463.3 463.3 6.0 0.0 0.0
Sudan 0.1 0.1 7.9 2.8 23.6 34.5 34.5 34.5 0.8 0.5
Tajikistan 2.3 1.5 56.7 27.3 29.8 1967.0 1967.0 80.3 12.3 0.6
Tanzania 0.3 0.0 7.9 1.0 6.2 19.5 19.5 24.5 0.1 0.6
Tunisia 0.2 0.1 0.1 1.5 2.4 7.8 7.8 19.2 5.2 0.8
Turkey 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.1 24.4 10.8 10.8 38.2 1.1 0.3
UK 0.0 0.0 32.2 23.7 2.9 0.7 2.7 1.3 0.0 0.1
US 0.0 10.6 1.2 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.9 1.7 0.3 0.0
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Tab. 3: The supply of plots for the default weight and change under two al-
ternative weightings (high commitment and low commitment.) Certain
countries are unusually dependent on the level of support the most rad-
ical segment provides, while others see relatively broad support for vio-
lence. Only the 30 largest sources are shown. For some countries in a
particular region the sensitivity is identical because direct survey data
was not always available. In those countries the radicalization values
(σr, σs, σo) were imputed from regional estimates.
Country Supply Si High commitment Low commitment
Indonesia 52745.4 -46.2% 24.6%
Nigeria 52687.8 -33.3% 17.8%
India 49624.7 -43.1% 23.0%
Bangladesh 39960.8 -33.8% 18.0%
Iran 26723.7 -30.6% 16.3%
Egypt 24731.6 -41.0% 21.8%
Pakistan 16537.8 -22.1% 11.8%
Algeria 12387.6 -30.6% 16.3%
Iraq 11021.7 -30.6% 16.3%
Sudan 10910.5 -30.6% 16.3%
Afghanistan 10168.3 -30.6% 16.3%
Saudi Arabia 9037.1 -30.6% 16.3%
Yemen 8462.6 -30.6% 16.3%
Ethiopia 8278.6 -39.7% 21.2%
Mali 8247.4 -23.2% 12.4%
Uzbekistan 8161.3 -43.1% 23.0%
Syria 7315.4 -30.6% 16.3%
Morocco 6878.5 -26.5% 14.1%
China 6680.7 -43.1% 23.0%
Niger 6497.3 -32.2% 17.2%
Malaysia 6466.6 -47.7% 25.4%
Turkey 5521.4 -44.0% 23.5%
Russian Federation 5081.9 -43.1% 23.0%
Palestine 4632.0 -21.1% 11.2%
Burkina Faso 4004.9 -32.2% 17.2%
Tunisia 3700.5 -30.6% 16.3%
Senegal 3668.5 -40.3% 21.5%
Guinea 3664.4 -32.2% 17.2%
Cote d’Ivoire 3338.1 -32.2% 17.2%
Somalia 3258.2 -30.6% 16.3%
In certain countries, such as Malaysia, Indonesia and Turkey support for
violence is relatively broad. This can be seen from the large decrease in supply
under the high-commitment scenario, (sr, ss, so)=(0.1, 0.2, 1.0), compared to
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the default weights (sr, ss, so)=(0.25, 0.50, 1.00). In regions such as the
Palestinian Territories, Pakistan and Morocco the support is more dependent
on the radical minority, as seen from the relatively small increase under the
scenario (sr, ss, so)=(0.33, 0.66, 1.00). Overall, the 10 largest sources of plots
are not more sensitive to those parameters than other sources.
B Computation of Probabilities
In the framework of the theory of complex networks, attack plots could be
represented as the motion of an adversary through a weighted network (the plot
itself is the adversary we wish to stop.) The adversary aims to find an attack
path or to hide, whichever plan has the lowest cost. To map such a decision to
the framework of activity networks, connect the “attack” and “abandon” nodes in
Fig. 2 to a node termed “end” with edges of cost 0. Thus, an attack on a country
j corresponds to an adversary that starts at country i and goes through country
j and then to the node “attack” and finally to “end”. The decision to abandon
corresponds to an adversary that starts at country i then goes to “abandon” and
then to “end”. The expected number of attacks on a particular target t can be
computed by combining information about path costs with information about
the supply of plots from a particular country Si and the yield of abandonment
A. Namely, it is the number of trips from all sources that arrive to the “attack”
node from target country t.
The least-cost path corresponds to the optimal choice by the terrorists, but
they can make mistakes. An attack plan under uncertainty could be described as
a Markov chain [14, Ch. 3]. The chain has initial distribution proportional to Si,
and a transition probability matrixM describing the likelihood of taking a par-
ticular edge on the network. The “end” node is the absorbing state of the chain.
The M matrix can be computed using the least-cost guided evader model de-
scribed in [14, Ch. 3]. Briefly, for each edge (u, v) of the network, the transition
probability through it is given by the formula Muv ∝ exp(−λ (c(puv)− c(pu∗)),
where c(pu∗) is the cost of the least-cost path from node u to the end node, and
c(puv) is the cost of the path through edge (u, v): puv = (u, v) ∪ pv∗. Thus, the
model generalizes the least-cost path model3. The parameter λ was set to 0.1,
in the reported data, but its value has a smooth effect on the predictions of the
model because of the smoothness of the exponential function. The number of
plots against a target country t is now found by taking the probability of a trip
to that target multiplied by the total number of plots (=
∑
i Si).
3 To compute the distances to the “end” node, c(puv), we use the Bellman-Ford algorithm
because edge weights are negative for some edges (e.g. yield from attacks). Ref. [14, Ch. 3]
uses the faster algorithm of Dijkstra because it treats only the case of positive weights.
